Manchester City’s financial statements do not contain an obvious confession or a single number that proves wrongdoing. What makes them unusual is the wider pattern: exceptionally rapid commercial growth, questions over the economic source of sponsorship money, complex intra-group balances, historical image-rights arrangements and limited public detail about how some major figures were tested.
That distinction matters. An unusual transaction is not necessarily a false transaction, while an unmodified audit opinion is not the same as regulatory clearance.
As of 29 September 2026, media reports confirmed by Reuters say an independent commission found Manchester City guilty of 114 of the 115 alleged Premier League breaches. However, the written decision and sanctions have not been published, the process is not complete, and City continue to deny wrongdoing and are expected to appeal.
Until the commission’s reasoning becomes public, it is impossible to say precisely which transactions were accepted, rejected or considered misleading. What can be examined is the financial trail that made those transactions so important.
Last updated: 29 September 2026.
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The Main Areas of Scrutiny
| Area | What makes it noteworthy | What it proves by itself |
|---|---|---|
| Commercial revenue growth | Sponsorship income increased extremely quickly after the Abu Dhabi takeover | Nothing without evidence about valuation and funding |
| Etihad and Etisalat sponsorships | Questions have been raised about whether the named sponsors were the ultimate source of all funds | The 2020 CAS case produced mixed findings |
| Related-party disclosures | City use lawful FRS 101 exemptions and operate within a complex group structure | Reduced public visibility, not evidence of concealment |
| Image-rights arrangements | A £24.5 million sale produced immediate income and transferred future costs | An unusual structure, but not automatically improper |
| Manager and player remuneration | The Premier League alleged that full payments were not included in registered contracts | Depends on whether the separate arrangements were genuine |
| Clean audit opinions | BDO continued to issue unmodified opinions despite the allegations | Meaningful assurance, but not regulatory exoneration |
1. Manchester City’s Commercial Revenue Changed Scale Very Quickly
The first number that attracts attention is commercial income.
City’s commercial partnership revenue rose from £32.4 million in 2009/10 to £48.5 million in 2010/11. It then doubled to £97 million in 2011/12, supported by the club’s new agreement with Etihad Airways and other commercial partnerships.
| Financial year | Total revenue | Commercial partnership revenue | Commercial growth | Commercial share of revenue |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2009/10 | £125.1m | £32.4m | – | 25.9% |
| 2010/11 | £153.2m | £48.5m | 49.7% | 31.7% |
| 2011/12 | £231.1m | £97.0m | 100.0% | 42.0% |
Sources: Manchester City’s 2010/11 annual-report announcement and 2011/12 annual report. Percentages in the final column are calculated from the reported figures.
Total revenue increased by more than 50% in 2011/12. Champions League participation contributed over £22 million of new income, but the commercial increase was also central to the transformation.
Commercial revenue has since become the largest individual part of City’s business. According to the club’s 2024/25 financial report, other commercial revenue reached £340.4 million.
Manchester City Revenue in 2024/25
| Revenue stream | Amount | Share of total revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Matchday | £75.1m | 10.8% |
| Broadcasting | £278.6m | 40.1% |
| Other commercial activities | £340.4m | 49.0% |
| Total | £694.1m | 100% |
Source: Manchester City Annual Report 2024/25. Percentages are rounded.
There are legitimate explanations for much of this transformation. City became a serial Premier League champion, built a worldwide following, played regularly in the Champions League and developed a much stronger commercial operation.
Rapid growth is therefore not proof that revenue was inflated. The reason it remains relevant is that the Premier League’s original charges specifically challenged the accuracy of financial information supplied between 2009/10 and 2017/18, including sponsorship revenue, related parties and operating costs.
The important question is not whether City became commercially more valuable. They clearly did. It is whether every sponsorship agreement during that transition reflected genuine third-party revenue at the amount and from the source reported.
2. Who Ultimately Funded the Sponsorship Money?
A sponsorship transaction can look straightforward in the accounts:
- A contract exists between the club and a sponsor.
- The sponsor transfers money to the club.
- The club records sponsorship revenue.
The difficult question is what happened before the money reached the sponsor.
The allegations surrounding Etihad and Etisalat have focused on whether entities connected to Manchester City’s owner supplied part of the funding attributed to those companies. If an owner funded a sponsor’s payment, describing the full amount as independent sponsorship could affect its treatment under football’s financial rules.
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This does not necessarily mean the cash receipt itself was fictitious. The money could have reached City’s bank account exactly as recorded. The dispute concerns its economic substance, source and related-party status.
That distinction was central to the 2020 Court of Arbitration for Sport decision.
The CAS majority found that Etihad transferred the relevant sponsorship payments to City and that UEFA had not produced sufficient evidence to establish that owner funding had been channelled through Etihad. The Etisalat allegations were considered time-barred rather than decided entirely on their factual merits.
CAS also found that City had failed to cooperate with UEFA’s investigation on two issues and imposed a €10 million fine.
| Issue considered by CAS | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Etihad sponsorship funding | CAS was not comfortably satisfied that disguised owner funding had been proved |
| Etisalat sponsorship funding | The relevant charge was ruled time-barred |
| Cooperation with UEFA | City were found to have failed to cooperate on two issues |
| Financial sanction | €10 million fine |
It is therefore inaccurate to say either that CAS proved the sponsorships were disguised owner funding or that CAS completely cleared every transaction.
The Etihad case was not established to the required standard, part of the Etisalat case could not proceed because of the limitation period, and the non-cooperation finding remained.
The Premier League case covers its own rules, evidence and limitation position. Its written decision will be essential before the historical sponsorship arrangements can be assessed properly.
3. The Public Accounts Do Not Show the Entire City Football Group Network
Manchester City Football Club Limited is one company inside City Football Group. Its 2024/25 accounts were prepared under the FRS 101 Reduced Disclosure Framework.
This framework legally allows qualifying subsidiaries to omit certain information that would otherwise appear in full IFRS accounts. City took exemptions covering areas including:
- A standalone cash-flow statement;
- Certain financial-instrument disclosures;
- Parts of the IFRS 15 revenue disclosures;
- Some related-party information;
- Transactions between wholly owned members of City Football Group.
These are normal and lawful exemptions. They are not accounting breaches.
However, they mean that the club’s public financial statements do not provide a complete transaction-by-transaction map of money moving through the wider group.
Manchester City’s Disclosed Intra-Group Balances
| Balance | 2023/24 | 2024/25 | Annual movement |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amounts owed by group undertakings | £267.4m | £366.9m | Increase of £99.5m |
| Amounts owed to group undertakings: current | £93.2m | £131.9m | Increase of £38.8m |
| Amounts owed to group undertakings: non-current | £0 | £102.0m | Increase of £102.0m |
Source: Notes 16–18 of Manchester City’s 2024/25 financial statements. Figures are rounded.
The £366.9 million receivable was due within one year and carried no interest. Meanwhile, the £102 million non-current liability arose after City Football Group USA transferred $140 million to the club through a quoted Eurobond.
The report says the loan is intended to support construction of the North Stand and Manchester Entertainment District. The balance is due in July 2030.
None of this is inherently improper. Large corporate groups regularly use intercompany loans, central treasury arrangements, service recharges and shared financing.
The point is narrower: somebody reading only Manchester City’s standalone accounts cannot reconstruct every underlying group cash flow. Some detail sits in City Football Group’s consolidated accounts, while some transactions between wholly owned entities are exempt from individual disclosure.
This also illustrates why football regulators now use broader Associated Party Transaction rules.
The Premier League has acknowledged that its previous system was ineffective when transactions could only be assessed after a club or its auditor had classified them as related-party transactions in the accounts. Its current APT framework uses a wider definition and requires significant transactions to be submitted for fair-market-value assessment.
Accounting disclosure and Premier League classification are related, but they are not identical tests.
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4. The £24.5 Million Image-Rights Transaction
One of the most unusual historical transactions involved Manchester City selling player image rights for £24.5 million during the 2012/13 financial year.
The structure gave City an immediate accounting benefit. The club recognised income from the sale while also transferring future image-rights payment obligations, reported to exceed £10 million per year, away from its own accounts.
| Reported feature | Accounting effect | Question requiring scrutiny |
|---|---|---|
| Sale price of £24.5m | Produced immediate income | Was the valuation commercially supportable? |
| Future image-rights costs transferred | Reduced costs remaining in City’s accounts | Did the buyer genuinely assume the economic burden? |
| Third-party company involved | Placed the arrangement outside the club | Who ultimately funded and controlled the arrangement? |
| Timing during early FFP period | Improved City’s reported financial result | Was the transaction driven by genuine commercial substance? |
The arrangement involved Manchester City Football Club (Image Rights) Limited and a company associated with Fordham Sports Management. City said Fordham continued to hold rights relating to some players but had chosen not to acquire those of more recent signings.
On paper, the transaction helped reduce City’s loss during an important early Financial Fair Play assessment period. It was examined in detail by Reuters and The Independent.
That does not automatically make the transaction false. Companies can sell intellectual property and recognise a gain when control, risk and economic benefits have genuinely transferred.
The important questions are:
- Was £24.5 million a supportable market value?
- Who ultimately financed the buyer?
- Did the buyer genuinely carry the commercial risk?
- Did City retain influence over the rights or continue to receive their benefits?
- Were future player payments genuinely transferred away from the club?
- Was the transaction independent or part of a wider owner-backed arrangement?
A transaction may satisfy the wording of a contract but still attract regulatory scrutiny if the economic risk never truly left the seller. That is why the Fordham structure is more significant than a simple one-off revenue entry.
5. Manager and Player Payments Are a Completeness Question
The Premier League’s charges also cover whether City disclosed full details of manager remuneration between 2009/10 and 2012/13 and player remuneration between 2010/11 and 2015/16.
This is different from arguing over the value of a sponsorship.
The accounting question is whether all costs connected to employing a manager or player were included in the club’s records. The regulatory question is whether every element of that remuneration appeared in the contracts registered with the Premier League.
Roberto Mancini was reportedly paid under a separate consultancy agreement with Al Jazira in Abu Dhabi while managing Manchester City. That arrangement was reported to provide a larger payment than his base City salary.
Mancini has acknowledged the existence of the separate contract while rejecting responsibility for any problem involving City, telling reporters that the issue did not concern him. The arrangement was covered by Reuters.
A genuine consultancy contract for separate work is not automatically improper. But if the Al Jazira agreement was effectively additional compensation for managing City, it could mean that:
- City’s true management cost was understated;
- The manager’s registered contract was incomplete;
- Part of the economic cost was carried by another owner-connected entity;
- Financial submissions to football authorities omitted relevant remuneration.
The same principle applies to player image-rights or third-party payment arrangements. The issue is not whether a document or invoice existed. It is whether the payment’s stated purpose matched its real purpose.
6. Several Large Figures Receive Limited Public Breakdown
City’s latest accounts contain some sizeable totals with relatively little public explanation.
Selected Manchester City Operating Expenses in 2024/25
| Expense category | 2023/24 | 2024/25 | Movement |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employee costs | £412.6m | £408.4m | Decrease of £4.2m |
| Other external charges | £172.4m | £187.8m | Increase of £15.4m |
| Amortisation and impairment of intangible assets | £165.1m | £169.5m | Increase of £4.4m |
| Total operating expenses | £780.0m | £790.2m | Increase of £10.3m |
Source: Note 5 of Manchester City’s 2024/25 financial report. Differences may reflect rounding.
Employee costs are clearly identified, but the £187.8 million recorded as “other external charges” is not divided into a detailed supplier-by-supplier or contract-by-contract schedule.
That level of aggregation is not unusual for a private company, and commercial confidentiality is a reasonable concern. It does, however, limit what an outsider can test.
There is also an important presentation issue in City’s revenue figures. The club reports outsourced retail activities on a net basis.
| 2024/25 revenue presentation | Amount |
|---|---|
| Reported revenue | £694.1m |
| Additional revenue if retail were reported gross | £61.8m |
| Illustrative gross revenue | £755.9m |
This is not evidence of hidden revenue. It reflects the accounting question of whether the club acts as the principal or agent in retail transactions.
It does show why headline revenue comparisons between football clubs are not always like-for-like. A low or high number is not necessarily suspicious; the accounting policy behind it can be just as important.
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7. The Premier League Case Is Acknowledged but Not Quantified
City’s 2024/25 strategic report acknowledges that the Premier League referred alleged breaches to an independent commission in February 2023. It also repeats the club’s position that it possesses a comprehensive body of evidence supporting its case.
The financial statements do not record a quantified provision for a possible Premier League fine.
That absence should not automatically be treated as a hidden problem. Under IAS 37, a provision is generally recognised only when:
- A present legal or constructive obligation exists;
- An outflow of economic resources is probable;
- A reliable estimate can be made.
A disputed proceeding with unknown financial and sporting sanctions may not meet those conditions at a particular reporting date.
The timing is also important. BDO signed the 2025 audit report on 8 October 2025, long before the September 2026 reports about the commission’s findings.
The next set of accounts will be more revealing. Depending on the written decision, any sanction and the status of an appeal, City and its auditor will have to reconsider whether additional provisions, contingent-liability disclosures or explanations are required.
8. What Does BDO’s Clean Audit Opinion Really Tell Us?
BDO issued an unmodified opinion on City’s 2024/25 financial statements. It concluded that they gave a true and fair view, complied with UK accounting standards and met Companies Act requirements.
That opinion is not meaningless.
BDO explicitly identified management override and inappropriate revenue journal entries as areas most susceptible to fraud. Its report says the audit team tested high-risk journals, including unusual combinations involving revenue accounts, challenged management’s estimates and considered compliance with Premier League and UEFA rules.
However, the same audit report explains that reasonable assurance is not a guarantee that every material misstatement will be detected. Fraud involving collusion, concealed documents or misleading third-party arrangements is harder to identify than an ordinary error.
There is another limitation: City are a private company, and their audit report does not contain the extensive Key Audit Matters, materiality and audit-scope disclosures commonly found in reports for listed public-interest entities.
The public can see the broad procedures BDO describes. It cannot see:
- Which sponsors were contacted directly;
- Whether bank statements from third parties were obtained;
- How large the samples were;
- Which historical transactions were retested;
- What contrary evidence was considered;
- What City told the auditors about the commission evidence;
- Whether specialists reviewed the economic substance of older arrangements.
Stefan Borson’s article, “Manchester City and 115: The Auditor in the Room”, makes an important point here.
Once detailed allegations existed, City’s auditors could no longer treat sponsorship revenue and remuneration as ordinary low-risk balances. Independent confirmations, wider testing and greater professional scepticism would have been expected.
Borson draws a comparison with the Financial Reporting Council’s 2026 findings against BDO over its audit of construction company NMCN.
In that case, the regulator found serious and pervasive failures, including reliance on internally produced reports instead of independent bank statements and leaving 44% of contract revenue without substantive detailed testing. BDO received a £1.33 million penalty.
The FRC’s full decision does not show that BDO failed at Manchester City. Its relevance is that it demonstrates the consequences for an auditor that signs an opinion without sufficient evidence.
The signature of senior statutory auditor Sakib Isa on City’s 2025 accounts therefore carries weight. Someone at BDO was willing to stand behind the opinion after the Premier League charges were public.
It still does not reveal exactly what evidence was examined, nor does it settle whether City complied with every Premier League rule.
Why an Audit and a Premier League Case Can Reach Different Answers
A statutory auditor and a football regulator are not answering the same question.
| Statutory audit | Premier League investigation |
|---|---|
| Are the financial statements materially misstated? | Were the League’s rules breached? |
| Focuses on the accounts as a whole | Can focus on individual contracts or submissions |
| Applies accounting materiality | A rule breach need not be material to total revenue |
| Provides reasonable, not absolute, assurance | Can examine good faith, cooperation and sporting integrity |
| Does not determine sporting sanctions | Can recommend fines, points deductions or other penalties |
| Uses company-law related-party rules | May use a broader associated-party definition |
A payment could be too small to change the audit opinion on a company with nearly £700 million of annual revenue but still breach a rule requiring full contractual disclosure.
Similarly, sponsorship revenue might be recognised under accounting rules because a contract exists and money was received, while the Premier League separately concludes that the transaction was not at fair market value or was connected to the owner.
That is why “the accounts were audited” is not a complete defence. It is also why the existence of charges does not automatically prove that every published account was materially false.
What the Written Decision Needs to Explain
When the commission’s full reasons become public, the most important financial questions will be:
- Which sponsorship payments were funded by parties other than the named sponsors?
- Were any sponsors treated incorrectly as independent parties?
- Were the sponsorship agreements genuine transactions but recorded at an improper value?
- Were payments to managers or players omitted from City’s operating costs?
- What was the commission’s view of the Fordham image-rights structure?
- Did any breach change City’s historical profit-and-loss or FFP calculations?
- Which allegations failed, and why?
- Were findings based on bank evidence, contracts, emails, witness testimony or adverse inferences from non-cooperation?
- Will any historical accounts or regulatory submissions need to be restated?
- Will the FRC review the work of any current or former auditor?
Without those answers, claims that the accounts definitively prove guilt – or definitively prove innocence – go beyond the available public evidence.
Final Verdict
There are genuine features of Manchester City’s financial statements that deserve close examination.
Commercial income increased extraordinarily quickly during the early Abu Dhabi years. Some major sponsorships involved organisations closely connected to Abu Dhabi. The Fordham image-rights transaction delivered immediate accounting benefits. The Premier League alleged that manager and player remuneration was incomplete.
The current group structure also contains hundreds of millions of pounds in intercompany balances, while lawful disclosure exemptions prevent outsiders from seeing every underlying movement.
Those are legitimate red flags in the sense that they identify areas requiring stronger evidence and scrutiny.
They are not, individually, proof of fraudulent accounting.
The strongest evidence will not be found in a simple revenue chart. It will come from bank records, sponsor confirmations, contractual obligations, the source of funds, internal correspondence and whether the commercial risk described on paper existed in practice.
Manchester City’s clean audit opinions matter because professional auditors were prepared to sign them. They do not replace the Premier League’s investigation, answer the regulatory questions or tell the public everything the auditors saw.
The accounts are therefore neither a conviction nor an acquittal. They are the starting point for understanding why the source, substance and disclosure of City’s money became one of the biggest financial cases in football history.
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